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I. Introduction
On September 27, 2016, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi was convicted
by a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court for the crime
of directing an attack against buildings dedicated to religion and
historic monuments which were not military objectives, pursuant to
article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute. Al Mahdi was sentenced to nine
years’ imprisonment. A month earlier, he had pleaded guilty to the
charge at the beginning of his trial, which as a consequence took only
a few days.
Pundits heralded the trial with clichés reserved for such occasions—
“landmark,” “historic judgment,” “breakthrough”—and it seemed as if
it was a long-awaited tonic for the struggling institution. This was an
easy win for the Court: an expeditious trial of a few days for a contrite
defendant previously linked to the global pariah, the “deviant people”
of Al Qaeda.1 But perhaps this gift came at a price that was too good
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1.

These were the words of Al Mahdi himself in his statement to the Court:
Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Transcript, 22 August 2016, p. 9, line 3.
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to be true. A closer look at the Rome Statute suggests that Al Mahdi
did not commit the crime for which he was convicted.
Al Mahdi admitted responsibility for acts relating to the
destruction of several mausoleums and the door of a mosque in
Timbuktu, Mali, buildings that had been traditionally used by the local
population as part of their religious observance. In 2012, when a rather
complex civil war erupted in Mali, the government abandoned the
northern provinces and religious extremists associated with Ansar Dine
seized control of Timbuktu. The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court observed that “[t]he Ansar Dine leadership is able to
control and govern parts of the territory through local councils
established in towns that fell under its control. Additionally, the group
reportedly set up a specialized police force in Timbuktu in order to
enforce the Sharia law.”2 As an eminent religious personality who had
joined the rebels, Al Mahdi delivered a sermon condemning worship at
the mausoleums. Subsequently, the rebel administration ordered that
the mausoleums be destroyed. Al Mahdi, who presided over a morality
tribunal known as the Hisbah, played a crucial role in implementing the
decision to destroy3 the buildings or structures in question, which at
the time were classified by UNESCO as “world heritage.”
Essentially identical provisions of the Rome Statute, one applicable
to international armed conflict and the other to non-international
armed conflict, govern the crime of “[i]ntentionally directing attacks
against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military
objectives.” Al Mahdi pleaded guilty to article 8(2)(e)(iv), the text that
applies to non-international armed conflict. That the structures
targeted by Al Mahdi were “buildings dedicated to religion” or that
they were “historic monuments” does not seem to be seriously disputed.
It was precisely because of their religious significance, something that
did not suit the beliefs of the regime with which Al Mahdi was
associated, that they were destroyed.4 Clearly they did not constitute a
“military objective.” Although civil war continued in the country,
Timbuktu seems to have been securely in the hands of the rebels at the
time and would remain so until the first months of the following year.
Indeed, based on the record before the Court it does not seem that
there was any activity that could be called “military” or “combat” at
the time the structures were destroyed. For this reason it is not at all
evident that the implementation of the administrative decision to
2.

Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali (Art. 53(1) Report, 16 January
2013, para. 82.

3.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Decision on the confirmation of charges
against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 24 March 2015, para. 49.

4.

Ibid., paras. 41-2.
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destroy the structures, carried out “with a variety of tools, including
pickaxes and iron bars,”5 constituted an “attack” as the term is used in
article 8 of the Rome Statute. And if it was not an “attack” as the term
is meant in article 8(2)(e)(iv), then Al Mahdi did not commit the
offense.
The definitions of crimes set out in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court are to be “strictly construed” and may
not “be extended by analogy.” Moreover, “[i]n case of ambiguity, the
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being
investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”6 In this respect, the
International Criminal Court may differ from other international
criminal tribunals that have been set up on a temporary basis and
where a more liberal and teleological approach to judicial interpretation
has been adopted, usually with reference to the rules of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.7 Judge Van den Wyngaert has
suggested that “[b]y including this principle in Part III of the Statute,
the drafters wanted to make sure that the Court could not engage in
the kind of “judicial creativity” of which other jurisdictions may at
times have been suspected.”8 Because in contending that the
destruction of the buildings in Timbuktu was an “attack,” judicial
creativity is precisely what is required.

II. Meaning of “Attack” in Article 8
Al Mahdi is the first accused person to be tried for “attacks” on
cultural property. Declaring that article 8(2)(e)(iv) has not previously
been applied by the Court, the Trial Chamber said it would “proceed

5.

Ibid., para. 37.

6.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90,
art. 22(2).

7.

See, for example, the 1994 Yearbook of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia where it is stated that ‘[i]n drafting
the rules, the judges of the Tribunal tried . . . to strike a balance between
the strictly constructionist and the teleological approaches in the
interpretation of its Statute’ (International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, Yearbook 1994, The Hague: United Nations
Publications, 1994, para. 53). Also: Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Judgment, 15 July
1999, para. 73; Erdemović (IT-96-22-A), Separate and Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cassese, 7 October 1997, para. 49; Kayishema et al. (ICTR-951-T), Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 103; Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T),
Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 319; Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3),
Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 51; Musema (ICTR-96-13), Judgment,
27 January 2000, para. 155.

8.

Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-02/12), Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van
den Wyngaert, 18 December 2012, para. 19.
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to interpret this crime and its elements.”9 It did not cite any case law
to support its conclusions. The Trial Chamber said case law of the
Court pertaining to attacks against civilian population “does not offer
guidance.”10 As for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, which has issued several decisions concerning attacks on
and destruction of cultural property, the Chamber said it is “limited
guidance” because the relevant legal text was not the same.11 Actually,
there is a lot of relevant case law that the Chamber ought to have
considered.
In ordinary usage, the term “attack” is not the word that would be
used to describe the demolition or destruction of structures, using
implements that are not weapons or military in nature, and where
armed adversaries are not to be found within hundreds of kilometers.
It is true that the Rome Statute contemplates an “attack” that takes
place in peacetime, but this is in the provision dealing with crimes
against humanity, not war crimes. Moreover, elsewhere in article 8, the
Rome Statute defines some crimes that involve “destruction,” and this
might suggest that “attack” and “destruction” are not synonymous.
The Chambers of the International Criminal Court as well as those of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have
considered the meaning of the word “attack” as it is used in the
definitions of war crimes on many occasions.
The words “[i]ntentionally directing attacks” are used in eight subparagraphs of article 8, the war crimes provision of the Rome Statute.
Neither the Statute itself nor the Elements of Crimes, adopted pursuant
to article 9 to supplement the Statute, indicate a definition of the word
“attacks.” The provisions of article 8 are derived from various treaties
governing the law of armed conflict, notably the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional
Protocols of 1977. Article 49 of Additional Protocol I is entitled
“Definition of attacks and scope of application.”12 Paragraph 1 of article
49 states that “‘Attacks’ means acts of violence against the adversary,
whether in offence or in defense.”
Several decisions of Chambers of the Court rely upon article 49(1)
of Additional Protocol I in order to construe the word “attacks” as it
is used in various sub-paragraphs of article 8 of the Statute.13 In Abu
9.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence, 27 September
2016, para. 14.

10.

Ibid., para. 16.

11.

Ibid.

12.

Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (1979) 1125
UNTS 3.

13.

Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the confirmation of the
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 267; Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09),
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Garda, a Pre-Trial Chamber justified recourse to article 49(1) by noting
the reference in article 8(2)(e) to “the established framework of
international law” as well as that in article 21(2) to applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of “the international law of armed conflict.”14 The
Chamber said that although article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I only
applied to international armed conflict, “this term is given the same
meaning in article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II (“APII”), which
applies to armed conflicts not of an international character.”15
Basing itself on article 3 of its Statute, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has confirmed the customary nature
of war crimes involving the direction of attacks against civilian objects.
Referring to article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I, the Tribunal has
consistently confirmed the technical meaning to be given to the term
“attack” of acts of violence, committed during combat using “armed
force” in a “military operation.”16
That “attacks” is to be interpreted with reference to article 49(1)
of Additional Protocol I is also confirmed in the authoritative academic
commentary on the Elements of Crimes published under the auspices
of the International Committee of the Red Cross. With respect to the
various provisions of article 8 that concern “attacks,” the Commentary
says that “[t]he concept of attack as defined in this provision refers to
the use of armed force to carry out a military operation during the
course of an armed conflict.”17 Discussing the term “attack” as it is used

Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, para. 64;
Banda et al. (ICC-02/05-03/09), Corrigendum of the ‘Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges’, 7 March 2011, para. 61; Mbarushimana (ICC01/04-01/10), Decision on the confirmation of charges, 16 December 2011,
para. 109; Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06), Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor
Against Bosco Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, para. 45.
14.

Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,
8 February 2010,, para. 64.

15.

Ibid., para. 65.

16.

Galić (IT-98-29-T), Judgment, 5 December 2003, para 52; Kordić and
Čerkez (IT-95-14/2-A), Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 47; Strugar
(IT-01-42-T), Judgment, 31 January 2005, para. 2ić82; Milošević,
Dragomir (IT-98-29§1-T), Judgment, 12 December 2007, para. 943;
Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Judgment, 6 September 2011, para. 91; Prlić et al.
(IT-04-81-T), Judgment, 6 September 2011, para. 91; Karadžić (IT-955/18-T), Public Redacted Version of Judgment Issued on 24 March 2016,
24 March 2016, para. 451.

17.

Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Sources and Commentary, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 134, 150-151, 156, 169, 178-179,
216, 350-351
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in article 8 in his contribution to the Triffterer Commentary, Knut
Dörmann wrote:
The term “attack” is specifically defined for IHL purposes and
means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offense
or in defence (article 49 para. 1 Add. Prot I). Its meaning is
unrelated to meanings given to the same term under ius ad
bellum. It refers to any combat action, thus offensive acts and
defensive acts (sometimes also called “counter attacks”). Thus,
for the purpose of this definition, it does not matter whether the
acts are committed by an aggressor or by the party acting in selfdefence.18

The commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross on
article 49 of Additional Protocol I confirms that “the term “attack”
means “combat action.”19
Finally, even the Office of the Prosecutor, in another context,
appears to have understood the special meaning to be given to the term
“attack” as it is used in article 8 of the Rome Statute. In its report on
the Gaza flotilla incident, the Office considered the application of
certain provisions of article 8 to the acts of Israeli military forces. It
said “that an attack for the purposes of this discussion must include a
forcible boarding operation, by analogy with other areas of international
humanitarian law in which an attack includes all acts of violence
against an adversary.”20 This shows that the Office of the Prosecutor
understood that article 8 should be interpreted with reference to
international humanitarian law in general. The expression “violence
against an adversary” used by the Office is obviously taken from article
49(1) of Additional Protocol I.
The word “attack” is also used in the crimes against humanity
definition, article 7 of the Rome Statute. However, the meaning of
“attack” in article 7 is not the same as in article 8. In fact, the Elements
of Crimes define in some detail the “attack directed against a civilian
population” of crimes against humanity, specifying that “[t]he acts need
18.

Roberta Arnold, Elisabeth Baumgartner, Michael Cottier, Knut
Dörmann, Robin Geiß, Julia Grignon, Sabine Klein, David Křivánek,
Emilia Richard, Stefan Wehrenberg and Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Article
8’, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos, eds., Commentary on the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 3rd edn,
Munich: C.H. Beck; Baden-Baden: Nomos; Oxford: Hart, 2015, pp. 281–
567, at p. 342 (internal reference omitted).

19.

Claude Pilloud and Jean Pictet, ‘Article 49’, in Yves Sandoz, Christophe
Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987,
pp. 601-608, at p. 603.

20.

Office of the Prosecutor, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros,
Greece and Cambodia, 6 November 2014, para. 93 (emphasis added).
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not constitute a military attack.”21 This “clarification” of the meaning
of the term in article 7 has been endorsed by Chambers of the Court.22
It provides confirmation of distinct meanings of the term “attack,”
depending upon whether article 7 or article 8 is being considered, and
also suggests, a contrario, that “military attack” is precisely what is
contemplated by article 8.
Had the Al Mahdi Trial Chamber discussed this case law and other
authorities, it would have been required to explain how the
implementation of a decision to demolish buildings using picks and
similar implements, in the absence of military activity by an adversary,
can be described as a “military attack” or “combat action.” The
Chamber explained that “the element of “direct[ing] an attack”
encompasses any acts of violence against protected objects and will not
make a distinction as to whether it was carried out in the conduct of
hostilities or after the object had fallen under the control of an armed
group.”23 All that can be said is that this is a major departure from a
consistent line of case law and scholarly commentary that the Trial
Chamber declined to even consider. The only explanation it provided
is that “[t]he Statute makes no such distinction.”24 It is an odd
comment, given that the Statute uses the term “attack” in eight subparagraphs while elsewhere it uses terms such as “destruction.” The
Chamber continued, in its very brief explanation:
This reflects the special status of religious, cultural, historical and
similar objects, and the Chamber should not change this status
by making distinctions not found in the language of the Statute.
Indeed, international humanitarian law protects cultural objects
as such from crimes committed both in battle and out of it.25

It is of course quite true that international humanitarian law protects
cultural objects both in battle and out of it, but that is hardly an
argument to support the application of a provision that is clearly

21.

Elements of Crimes, Introduction to Article 7 of the Statute, paragraph
3.

22.

Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09), Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, para. 80;
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (ICC-02/11), Corrigendum to
‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire’, 15
November 2011, para. 31; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, para. 149.

23.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence, 27 September
2016, para. 15.

24.

Ibid.

25.

Ibid. (internal reference omitted).
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directed at acts perpetrated during a battle to those that take place
“out of it.”
The Chamber should also have acknowledged the decisions of other
Chambers of the International Criminal Court that recognize a clear
distinction between the crimes involving “attacks,” where these have
been held this to involve a battle or military action between combatant
forces, and war crimes that are directed at persons under the control of
one of the parties but that take place away from the actual battlefield.
According to a Pre-Trial Chamber,
[t]he war crime provided for in article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Statute is
the first in the series of war crimes for which one essential element
is that the crime must be committed during the conduct of
hostilities (commonly known as “conduct of hostilities crimes”).
Accordingly, this crime is applicable only to attacks (acts of
violence) directed against individual civilians not taking direct
part in the hostilities, or a civilian population, that has not yet
fallen into the hands of the adverse or hostile party to the conflict
to which the perpetrator belongs.26

The Pre-Trial Chamber distinguished such “conduct of hostilities
crimes” from other war crimes that apply once the victims have “fallen
into the hands” of the adverse party. Convicting Katanga for the war
crime of attacking civilians, the Trial Chamber provided a detailed
description of the armed military attack on Bogoro in which noncombatant civilians were targeted.27 It is noteworthy that the Katanga
Pre-Trial Chamber referred in directly to the war crime of attacking
cultural objects when it referred to “the series of war crimes for which
one essential element is that the crime must be committed during the
conduct of hostilities (commonly known as ‘conduct of hostilities
crimes’).”
The same assessment of article 8 was made by a Pre-Trial Chamber
in Ntaganda: “The war crime of attacking civilians belongs to the
category of offences committed during the actual conduct of hostilities
by resorting to prohibited methods of warfare.”28 The Pre-Trial
Chamber said that “in principle, any conduct, including shelling,
sniping, murder, rape, pillage, attacks on protected objects and
destruction of property, may constitute an act of violence for the
purpose of the war crime of attacking civilians, provided that the
26.

Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the confirmation of the

27.

Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the
Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 798.

28.

Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06), Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco
Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, para. 45.

charges, 30 September 2008, para. 267 (internal footnotes omitted).
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perpetrator resorts to this conduct as a method of warfare and, thus,
that there exists a sufficiently close link to the conduct of hostilities.”29
The Chamber explained that “this sufficiently close link between acts
of violence underlying the “attack” and the actual conduct of hostilities
does not exist when the acts of violence (such as murder, rape, pillage
or destruction of property) are committed against civilians that have
fallen into the hands of the attacking party or are committed far from
the combat area.”30
Thus, case law of the Court has made a very clear distinction
between the war crimes associated with “battlefield attacks,” of which
article 8(2)(e)(iv) is a species, and those that are associated with the
conflict but that take place after a civilian population has “fallen into
the hands” of the party charged with violating the laws and customs of
war. The situation in “occupied” Timbuktu belongs to this second
category. At the very least, the Trial Chamber in Al Mahdi should have
discussed these inconvenient precedents.
The distinction made in the case law of the Court between offenses
related to the conduct of the hostilities and those applicable to persons
and property that have fallen into the hands of a party to the conflict
was not cut from whole cloth. It finds its origins in the earliest legal
instruments of the laws of armed conflict. The same distinction appears
in the regulations annexed to the second Hague Convention of 1899 and
fourth Hague Convention of 1907, which are the ancestors of our
modern law on war crimes. One section of the 1907 regulations governs
“Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments” while
another is concerned with “Military Authority over the Territory of the
Hostile State.” Each of these two sections contains a provision on
cultural property. one applicable to the conduct of hostilities, using the
expression “sieges and bombardments” (art. 27), and the other to
military authority over the territory (art. 56), where the words “seizure
of, destruction or wilful damage” are used. It is article 56, not article
27, that applies to the acts of Al Mahdi in Timbuktu.
The Trial Chamber quite correctly acknowledges that there are two
relevant provisions in the Hague Convention, and that “[t]he special
protection of cultural property in international law can be traced back
to Articles 27 and 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.”31 Its curiosity as
to why there are two provisions does not seem to have been aroused.
As a general rule, when there are two distinct provisions dealing with
an issue in a legal instrument, there is a reason. The drafters are not
presumed to be like the man who wears both a belt and braces, as if to
emphasis a point by stating it twice. The Trial Chamber ought to have
examined the rationale of the two provisions, especially given the
29.

Ibid.

30.

Ibid., para. 47.

31.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence, 27 September
2016, para. 14.
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phrase “within the established framework of international law” in the
chapeau of article 8(2)(e).
The drafters of the Rome Statute understood the distinction
between the two provisions in the Hague Regulations. In finalizing
article 8, they quite deliberately used article 27, not article 56, as the
model. According to William J. Fenrick, the provisions in article 8 on
cultural property “restate [. . .], in substance, article 27 of the
Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV.”32 This is very clear from
the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute.

III. Origins of the Rome Statute Cultural Property
Provisions
The draft statute of an international criminal court submitted to
the United Nations General Assembly by the International Law
Commission in 1994 provided for jurisdiction over “[s]erious violations
of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict.”33 The
Commission did not actually propose a detailed definition but it cited
the war crimes provisions of two relevant instruments: the Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“seizure
of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic
monuments and works of art and science”34) and the draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (“wilful attacks on
property of exceptional religious, historical or cultural value”35). The
former appears inspired by article 56 of the Hague Regulations, while
the latter is derived from article 27.
The text of article 8 of the Rome Statute was negotiated over the
course of three years within the Preparatory Committee and only
underwent a limited number of final adjustments at the Rome
Conference, in 1998. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee,
in March-April 1996, the chairman circulated an informal text with a
lengthy list of war crimes that included the text of article 3(d) of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia,36 a provision that is adapted from article 56 of the
regulations annexed to the fourth Hague Convention of 1907. A revised
text, issued by the chairman at the conclusion of that session, included
32.

William J. Fenrick, ‘Intentionally directing attacks against protected
buildings’, in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, BadenBaden: Nomos, 1999, p. 214.

33.

UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part2), pp. 38-40.

34.

UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), annex, art. 2(d).

35.

UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.l (Part 2), pp. 94-97, art. 22(f).

36.

Chairman’s Informal Text No. 4, 4 April 1996. Proposals to this effect
had been made earlier in the session by Italy and Austria.
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a much more elaborate proposal. Listed under the rubric of “grave
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions was the following:
making clearly recognized historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples and to which special protection has been given
by special arrangement, for example, within the framework of a
competent international organization, the object of attack,
causing, as a result, intensive destruction thereof, where there is
no evidence of the violation by the adverse party of using such
objects in support of a military effort, and when such historic
monuments, works of art and places of worship are not located in
the immediate proximity of military objectives[.]37

The text reproduces article 85(4)(d) of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. It speaks of an “attack” that causes or results in
“intensive destruction.” The draft also included a second category of
war crimes in international armed conflict labelled “other serious
breaches of the laws and customs of war.” It contained a paragraph
taken from article 3(d) of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. There was also a much shorter list
of war crimes in non-international armed conflict with no provision on
cultural property.38
In the interim, between the two 1996 sessions of the Preparatory
Committee, the International Law Commission adopted the final
version of the draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. It containing the text of the provision on cultural property
in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia.39 The provision only applied to international armed
conflict. The Code’s very summary paragraphs on non-international
armed conflict did not include a text on cultural property. The
accompanying commentary explained that the sub-paragraph on
cultural property “would cover, inter alia, the cultural property
protected by the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, as well as the literary and artistic works
protected by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works.”40
37.

Chairman’s revised informal text on war crimes, UN Doc.
A/AC.249/CRP.9/Add.4, pp. 6-7. Also: Summary of the Proceedings of
the Preparatory Committee during the period 25 March-12 April 1996,
UN Doc. A/AC.249/1, pp. 62-3; Report of the Preparatory Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume II, UN
Doc. A/51/22, pp. 59-60.

38.

Ibid.

39.

UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2), p. 53.

40.

Ibid., p. 55.
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In August 1996, Japan circulated a draft war crimes provision,
confined only to international armed conflict, with a definition similar
to that of article 3(d) of the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: “Seizure or destruction of or wilful
damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education or
the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and
science.”41 However, the definitions of crimes were not discussed at the
August 1996 session of the Preparatory Committee. The report on the
1996 sessions of the Preparatory Committee states that “[s]everal
delegations expressed the view that the list of offenses should include
sufficiently serious violations of the Hague law, with references being
made to … the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.”42
At the third session of the Preparatory Committee, in February
1997, the United States produced a new draft of a war crimes provision.
Under the subheading “other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict within the established
framework of international law” was the following text, where the
outlines of the final provisions in the Rome Statute can be easily
discerned: “intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated
to religion, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, unless
such property is used in support of the military effort.” The United
States draft also contained a text on war crimes in non-international
armed conflict but with no text on cultural property.43 When all of the
submissions on war crimes were compiled subsequently, a footnote
indicated that the United States proposal on cultural property was
based on article 27 of the Regulations annexed to the fourth Hague
Convention of 1907.44 That text in full reads as follows: “In sieges and
bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for
military purposes.” It is clearly a “battlefield” provision, directed to the
conduct of hostilities, and not one addressed to the treatment of
41.

Proposal submitted by Japan on the definition of war crimes, UN Doc.
A/AC.249/WP.48.

42.

Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Volume I, UN Doc. A/51/22, para. 81.

43.

Proposal
submitted
by
A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/DP.1.

44.

Draft consolidated text, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.2, p.4, fn.
12. See also: Decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee at its session
held from 11 to 21 February 1997, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5, pp. 89.
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civilians and their property once they have fallen into the hands of the
adverse party.
Switzerland and New Zealand also prepared a draft war crimes
provision with a text on cultural property in international armed
conflict derived from article 85 of Additional Protocol I. Their draft
contained a more succinct text applicable to non-international armed
conflict: “Attacks directed against historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship, which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of
peoples, and to use them in support of the military effort.”45
In June and July 1997, the German foreign ministry hosted
informal meetings devoted to the war crimes provisions of the draft
statute. Germany subsequently circulated an “informal working paper”
reflecting the discussions at those meetings. The various alternative
provisions on cultural property had been dropped in favor of the text
proposed by the United States, which was made applicable to noninternational as well as to international armed conflict. The concluding
words “unless such property is used in support of the military effort”
were replaced with “provided they are not being used at the time for
military purposes.”46 The German compilation was circulated officially
at the December 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee.47 There,
an alternative text emerged whereby the word “education,” was added
after religion.48 The two texts underwent no further modification by the
Preparatory Committee.49
The cultural property provisions were subject to slight further
modification during the Rome Conference, in June and July 1998. The
version containing the word “education,” was adopted and the last
phrase changed to read “provided they are not military objectives.” The
Official Records of the Rome Conference credit authorship of the
cultural property provisions to a proposal by the United States.50 No
other changes or amendments appear to have been proposed. Accounts

45.

Ibid., p. 4.

46.

Informal working paper on war crimes (Rev. 1), 14 July 1997, pp. 2, 4.
Also Informal working paper on war crimes, 31 October 1997.

47.

Informal
working
paper
on
war
crimes,
UN
Doc.
A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.7; also Informal working paper on war
crimes, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.8.

48.

War crimes, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.9, pp. 4, 9; Decisions
taken by the Preparatory Committee at its session held from 1 to 12
December 1997, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1, pp. 6, 11.

49.

Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, pp. 18,
22-3.

50.

United States of America: proposal regarding article 5, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.8.
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by participants in the Rome Conference and by academic commentators
do not shed additional light on the provision.51
The travaux préparatoires indicate that the drafters were familiar
with two models or types of provision governing cultural property, one
applicable to the conduct of hostilities and the other to persons and
property that have fallen under the control of one of the parties. The
second of the two, derived from article 56 of the 1907 Hague regulations,
figured in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia,52 and was actively considered at the initial sessions
of the Preparatory Committee. It was also adopted by the International
Law Commission in the 1996 draft Code of Crimes. However, consensus
subsequently emerged around a draft proposed by the United States,
where the word “attacks” was employed, that was based on the
alternative whose ancestor was article 27 of the Hague Regulations.
In addition to the two cultural property articles, several other
provisions of article 8 deal with directing attacks at unlawful targets.
The sub-paragraphs of the Rome Statute dealing with international
armed conflict begin with provisions about targeting civilians and
civilian objects. Those governing non-international armed conflict are
somewhat leaner, with a prohibition on targeting civilians but nothing
about civilian objects. These texts were largely derived from the two
Additional Protocols of 1977, and the more laconic provisions of the
Rome Statute dealing with non-international armed conflict reflect the
fact that the Additional Protocol II, governing non-international armed
conflict, is much shorter than the Additional Protocol I. As the
Commentary on the Protocols by the International Committee of the
Red Cross explains, “[u]nlike Protocol I, which contains detailed rules,
only the fundamental principles on protection for the civilian
population are formulated in Protocol II and it is done in a very
rudimentary form in this article…”53 Early drafts of Additional Protocol
II contained a text on attacks directed at civilian objects but this was

51.

Herman von Hebel and Daryl Robinson, ‘Crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The
Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results, The
Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 79-126;
William J. Fenrick, ‘Article 8’, in Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes,
Article by Article, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, pp. 186-7, 214.

52.

Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph (2) of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), paras. 41-4.

53.

Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod,’Article 13’, in Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski
and Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, pp. 14471453, at p. 1448.
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“dropped at the last moment as part of a package aimed at the adoption
of a simplified text.”54
That civilian objects may not be made the object of an attack is a
well-understood principle of the law of armed conflict. It might be asked
why there is any need for a specific prohibition dealing with attacks
upon cultural property, given that it appears to be nothing more than
a specific manifestation of an attack that is in any case prohibited by
the general provision. The Pre-Trial Chamber in Al Mahdi described
article 8(2)(e)(iv) as “lex specialis to the war crime of intentionally
attacking civilian objects.”55 Writing about the cultural property
provisions of the Rome Statute, Michael Bothe said that “in addition
to creating confusion as to buildings enjoying a special protected status,
the present provision does not add anything to the general protection
of those buildings as civilian objects.”56 In Al Mahdi, The Trial
Chamber did not use the lex specialis terminology. It dismissed the
relevance of case law dealing with attacks on civilians and civilian
objects, treating article 8(2)(e)(iv) as a kind of sui generis provision
rather than as a specialized example of the more general rule.57
Because the drafters of the Rome Statute rejected the formulation
on cultural property in the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the very abundant case law of that
body is of rather limited use in the interpretation of article 8 of the
Rome Statute.58 Recently, a Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in Prlić et al., held that
Bosnian Croat forces had committed the grave breach of “Extensive
Destruction of Property, Not Justified by Military Necessity and
54.

Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary
International Law, Vol. I: Rules, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005, at p. 27.

55.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Decision on the confirmation of charges
against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 24 March 2015, para. 43.

56.

Michael Bothe, ‘War crimes’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John
R.W.D. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 379426, at p. 410.

57.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence, 27 September
2016, para. 15.

58.

On the case law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, see: Roger O’Keefe,
‘Protection of Cultural Property under International Criminal Law’,
(2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law 339; Roger O’Keefe,
‘Protection of Cultural Property’, in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta,
eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 492-520; Micaela Frulli,
‘Advancing the Protection of Cultural Property through the
Implementation of Individual Criminal Responsibility: the Case-Law of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, (2005)
15 Italian Yearbook of International Law 195.
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Carried Out Unlawfully and Wantonly” when, in the days following
battles in various municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina they
destroyed homes of the Muslim population as well as mosques.59 It also
dealt with damage to other buildings of cultural and historical
significance, including the famous old bridge of Mostar, under the
heading “Wanton Destruction of Cities, Towns or Villages, or
Devastation Not Justified by Military Necessity,” a violation of the laws
or customs of war.60 Moreover, it addressed the destruction of some
mosques as the war crime of “Destruction or Wilful Damage to
Institutions Dedicated to Religion or Education.”61 Any of these war
crimes, recognized by the International Criminal Tribunal as
punishable under customary international law,62 might have provided a
basis for prosecution of the acts perpetrated by Al Mahdi in Timbuktu.
Unfortunately, none of them is to be found in the provisions of the
Rome Statute dealing with non-international armed conflict.
The Al Mahdi Trial Chamber made a curious comment about the
possible application of another war crime, that of “[d]estroying or
seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict,” set out in
article 8)(2)(e)(xii). It said that the matter was not raised by the parties
and concluded that it was not therefore necessary for it to consider a
re-characterization of the crime, in exercise of its authority under
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.63 It appeared to think
this unnecessary because “the specific intent of the defendant to attack
protected objects meets squarely the mens rea requirement of Article
8(2)(e)(iv).”64 There is at least one good reason why article 8(2)(e)(xii)
is inapplicable. Like several crimes involving the destruction or seizure
of property, as opposed to an attack on such objects, ownership of the
object must be established. Article 8(2)(e)(xii) requires that the
property be that “of an adversary.” According to the Trial Chamber in
Katanga, “this means that the property in question—whether moveable
or immoveable, private or public—must belong to individuals or entities
aligned with or with allegiance to a party to the conflict adverse or

59.

Prlić et al. (IT-04-74-T), Judgment, 29 May 2013, Vol. 3, paras. 15231556.

60.

Ibid., paras. 1557-1599.

61.

Ibid., paras. 1600-1618.

62.

See, for example, Kordić et al. (IT-95-14/2-T), Judgment, 26 February
2001, para. 203; Kordić et al. (IT-95-14/2-A), Judgment, 17 December
2004, paras. 76. 91-92.

63.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence, 27 September
2016, para. 12.

64.

Ibid.
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hostile to the perpetrator.”65 But in this civil war in Mali, where the
rebel Ansar Dine forces appear to have enjoyed some degree of popular
support, at least in the early months, can it really be said that the
cultural objects were the property of the “adversary?” They seem to
have belonged to the community in a collective sense. In the sentencing
part of the judgment, the Trial Chamber noted how Al Mahdi had
initially opposed the destruction of the structures “so as to preserve
good relations with the population of Timbuktu.”66
Had the Trial Chamber considered article 8(2)(e)(xii) more
thoroughly, it might also have observed that there is a companion
provision applicable to international armed conflict, article
8(2)(b)(xiii). According to Andreas Zimmermann and Robin Geiß, this
provision “was indeed meant to address the fate of any enemy property
located in territories which have come under the de facto control of a
belligerent.”67 Of course, article 8(2)(b) also has a paragraph dealing
with attacks on civilian objects, but there is no corresponding provision
in article 8(2)(e). This further confirms that the drafters of the Rome
Statute distinguished between war crimes committed in the conduct of
hostilities and those committed when persons and property have fallen
under the control of the adverse party.

IV. Other Legal Instruments of Relevance
Reference has already been made to the relevant provisions of the
Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention and to the 1954
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, both of which were familiar to the drafters of the
Rome Statute and influential in the drafting. However, neither of these
two early texts concerns criminal prosecution. The 1954 Convention is
also important in the interpretation of the relevant provisions of
Additional Protocol I. The 1954 Convention is the centerpiece of a
substantial body of international law concerning “cultural property”68
65.

Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the
Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 892. Also: Mbarushimana (ICC-01/0401/10), Decision on the confirmation of charges, 16 December 2011, para.
171.

66.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence, 27 September
2016, para. 89.

67.

Andreas Zimmermann and Robin Geiß, ‘Paragraph 2(b)(xiii): Prohibited
destruction’, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos, eds., Commentary on the

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes,
Article by Article, 3rd edn., Munich: C.H. Beck, Baden-Baden: Nomos,
Oxford: Hart, 2015, pp. 436-444.

68.

(1956) 249 UNTS 240. See: Roger O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006; Kevin Chamberlain, War and Cultural Heritage: An Analysis of
the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
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although most of it is not of much relevance to the interpretation of
the Rome Statute provisions. For example, it defines a special category
of structure deserving of “special protection.”69 However, in the Rome
Statute, there is no such distinction. The International Criminal Court
does not have to determine whether the target of the attack constituted
“cultural property” or something “of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people,” concepts set out in article 1 of the 1954
Convention. The provisions of the Rome Statute apply to “buildings
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes,
historic monuments,” regardless of whether they are part of the
“cultural heritage.” Testifying as an expert before the Court in Al
Mahdi, the assistant director general of UNESCO spoke of the 1954
Hague Convention being “less effective than we would hope because of
the nature of the conflict. However, it is the only one that the
international community has in terms of a tool . . .”70
One legal instrument that had not yet been adopted at the time of
the Rome Conference but whose drafting was already well underway is
the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, adopted in 1999.71
It is of particular interest because it is in part an international criminal
law treaty. Article 15 of the Protocol is entitled “[s]erious violations of
the Protocol” and reads as follows:
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Protocol if that person intentionally and in violation of the
Convention or this Protocol commits any of the following acts:
a. making cultural property under enhanced protection the object
of attack;

of Armed Conflict and its Two Protocols, Leicester: Institute of Art and
Law, 2004; Jiri Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict and its Protocol, signed on 14 May 1954 in The Hague,
and on Other Instruments of International Law Concerning such
Protection, Aldershot: UNESCO, 1996.
69.

There is a substantial discussion of this background in the Triffterer
Commentary, by Roberta Arnold and Stefan Wehrenberg: Otto Triffterer
and Kai Ambos, eds., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 3rd
edn., Munich: C.H. Beck, Baden-Baden: Nomos, Oxford: Hart, 2015, pp.
405-9. See also: Roger O’Keefe, ‘Protection of Cultural Property’, in
Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta, eds., The Oxford Handbook of
International Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014, pp. 492-520, at p. 499.

70.

El Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Transcript, 23 August 2016, p. 35, lines 34.

71.

(2004) 2253 UNTS 172.
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b. using cultural property under enhanced protection or its
immediate surroundings in support of military action;
c. extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property
protected under the Convention and this Protocol;
d. making cultural property protected under the Convention and
this Protocol the object of attack;
e. theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism
directed against cultural property protected under the
Convention.

It is not without interest that the Protocol distinguishes between
“attack” on cultural property, in paragraphs a and d, and its
“destruction,” in paragraph c, echoing the distinctions that date back
to the 1907 Hague Convention. Various obligations concerning a duty
to prosecute and extradite and similar matters apply with respect to
such crimes. The Protocol now has about seventy States Parties.72
Another subsequent instrument is the Law on the Extraordinary
Chambers of Cambodia. It makes specific reference to the 1954 Hague
Convention (although not to the 1999 Protocol): “The Extraordinary
Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects responsible
for the destruction of cultural property during armed conflict pursuant
to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, and which were committed during the
period from April 17, 1975 to January, 6 1979.”73 Use of the noun
“destruction” seems especially apropos given that the prosecutions deal
with acts perpetrated by a regime in the exercise of State power rather
than those committed in the heat of battle, during the conduct of armed
hostilities.

V. The Nexus Requirement
The issue of the nexus between the acts of Al Mahdi and the armed
conflict is distinct from the interpretation of article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the
Rome Statute, although some similar issues present themselves. If a
strict interpretation of article 8(2)(e)(iv) is adopted, the provision does
not apply to the acts of Al Mahdi and the issue of nexus simply does
72.

On the second Protocol, see Micaela Frulli, ‘The Criminalization of
Offences against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The Quest
for Consistency,’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 203.

73.

See Caroline Ehlert, Prosecuting the Destruction of Cultural Property in
International Criminal Law: With a Case Study on the Khmer Rouge’s
Destruction of Cambodia’s Heritage, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013.
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not arise. However, even if the broadened understanding of “attacks”
that was adopted by the Trial Chamber is followed, it is still necessary
to establish a nexus with the acts and the armed conflict. The nexus
issued was essentially ignored in both the confirmation decision and the
final judgment. All that the Trial Chamber did was declare itself to be
“satisfied” that there was an association between the destruction of the
mausoleums and the armed conflict.74
The requirement that there be a nexus or connection between the
impugned conduct and an armed conflict is a well-accepted principle of
international criminal law. Each of the Elements of Crimes of war
crimes requires that “[t]he conduct took place in the context of and was
associated with an armed conflict.” The nexus is sometimes explained
as follows: “the alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities.”75
The principle was set out in an early judgment of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: “[t]he existence of an
armed conflict . . . is not sufficient . . . For a crime to fall within the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, a sufficient nexus must be
established between the alleged offence and the armed conflict which
gives rise to the applicability of international humanitarian law.”76
According to case law of the International Criminal Court, the
armed conflict “must play a substantial role in the perpetrator’s
decision, in his ability to commit the crime or in the manner in which
the conduct was ultimately committed.”77 But “[i]t is not necessary,
however, for the armed conflict to have been regarded as the ultimate
reason for the criminal conduct, nor must the conduct have taken place
in the midst of the battle.”78 Acts perpetrated in the course of armed
hostilities provide the most straightforward application of the nexus.
An “attack” directed at a civilian object located on or near a battlefield,
“in the course of fighting or the take-over of a town during an armed
conflict,”79 does not present much difficulty in this respect, nor do
74.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence, 27 September
2016, para. 49.

75.

Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges,
29 January 2007, para. 288; Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision
on the Confirmation of the Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 380.

76.

Tadić (IT-94-1-T), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, para. 572.

77.

Ibid., para. 287; Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the
Confirmation of the Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 380; Abu Garda
(ICC-02/05-02/09), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February
2010, para. 90. See also: Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, para. 142; Katanga (ICC01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March
2014, para. 1776.

78.

Ibid.

79.

Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 193.
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situations where “the crimes are committed in the aftermath of the
fighting, and until the cessation of combat activities in a certain region,
and are committed in furtherance or take advantage of the situation
created by the fighting.”80 The nexus will also be apparent in the case
of a prison camp operated in the context of an armed conflict.81 In the
Lubanga case, the Trial Chamber barely considered the nexus issue,
given the obvious connection between the recruitment of child soldiers
and the armed conflict itself.82 It may even be possible for war crimes
other than the child soldier offenses to be perpetrated against victims
who have not “fallen into the hands of the adverse party” but are “on
the same side” as the perpetrator. A case currently pending before the
Court concerns sexual assaults perpetrated against child soldiers by
members of the forces to which they belong.83
Where the victims are civilians in an occupied territory, the nexus
also seems self-evident, to the extent that the act is directly dependent
upon the situation of occupation and would not have taken place
without it. The nexus issue will generally be resolved with reference to
the status of the perpetrator and the victim. In other words, the nexus
is established because the act is perpetrated by the occupier against the
occupied, who is “in the hands of the adverse party.” The Rome Statute
only has one category of crime that is specifically directed to a situation
of occupation, the “transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying
Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population
of the occupied territory within or outside this territory.” There is no
equivalent provision applicable to non-international armed conflict. In
a civil war, both sides are vying for power and control; neither can
really be characterized as an “occupier.” It is not without interest that
in the Al Mahdi case, the Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial Chamber and the
Trial Chamber all spoke of the “occupation” of Timbuktu.84 The term
80.

Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T), Judgment, 22 February
2001, para. 568.

81.

Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 16 November 1998, paras. 196-7.

82.

Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 1350.

83.

Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06), Decision on the Defence’s challenge to the
jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9, 9 October 2015,
para. 25. Also: Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06), Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor
against Bosco Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, paras. 76–82.

84.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Version publique expurgée du « Document
présentant les conclusions factuelles et juridiques du Bureau du Procureur
au soutien du Chef d’accusation dans l’affaire contre Ahmad AL FAQI
AL MAHDI » ICC-01/12-01/15-66-Conf, 17 December 2015, paras. 13,
18, 31-46, etc.; Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Decision on the confirmation
of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 24 March 2016, paras. 30,
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seems appropriate, but in a colloquial rather than a legal sense, because
the “occupiers” were parties to a non-international armed conflict. To
their supporters, they were the “liberators,” not the “occupiers,” of
Timbuktu. From the standpoint of international humanitarian law,
they had as much right to be there as the government of the country.
For this reason, the obvious nexus where a territory is occupied in the
course of an international armed conflict cannot be mechanistically
transposed to a civil war.
The word “nexus” does not appear in the confirmation decision or
the judgment. In submissions to the Chamber prior to the confirmation
hearing, the Prosecutor set out a detailed argument with respect to the
nexus.85 The Prosecutor’s analysis of the nexus issue can be summarized
as follows: the “attack” on the structures was undertaken by members
of groups that were responsible for military activities in the north of
the country; the members of these groups were able to commit the
“attack” because they had conquered parts of the north of the country
and the city of Timbuktu; the “attack” was supervised by the head of
an organization set up by the armed groups; the apparent motives of
the “attack” were the same as those of the armed groups; Al Mahdi’s
conduct was “facilitated” by the existence of an armed conflict and
motivated by the ideological goals of the armed groups to which he
fully subscribed. In Al Mahdi, the Court seems to have assumed that
because the armed conflict persisted after the rebel forces had taken
control of Timbuktu, essentially everything that the Anser Dine regime
did was enough to satisfy the nexus.
The Prosecutor confounded the military aspect of the conflict and
the ideological agenda of the rebel group. In her report on the
preliminary examination, the Prosecutor described Ansar Dine as “a
Tuareg jihadist salafist movement, aiming to impose Sharia law in all
of Mali.”86 In her principal submission to the Pre-Trial Chamber, she
cited the following as evidence of the motives of Ansar Dine: “Le groupe
entend instaurer la charia sur ses membres et les autres musulmans
pour la paix et le salut au Mali. De fait, le Mali a envoyé des militaires
sur nos terres et on s’est défendu.”87 These are not “military” objectives.
44-5, 50, 54, etc.; Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Judgment and Sentence,
27 September 2016, paras. 33, 36, 53.
85.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Version publique expurgée du « Document
présentant les conclusions factuelles et juridiques du Bureau du Procureur
au soutien du Chef d’accusation dans l’affaire contre Ahmad AL FAQI
AL MAHDI » ICC-01/12-01/15-66-Conf, 17 December 2015, paras. 258261.

86.

Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali (Art. 53(1) Report, 16 January
2013, para. 31 (reference omitted).

87.

Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Version publique expurgée du « Document
présentant les conclusions factuelles et juridiques du Bureau du Procureur
au soutien du Chef d’accusation dans l’affaire contre Ahmad AL FAQI
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The destruction of the structures was in pursuit of Ansar Dine’s
extremist ideology and would undoubtedly have taken place had the
group been able to take and hold power without the use of force.
Sometimes “rebel” organizations take power peacefully, often
through democratic elections. Obviously, then, their acts of public
administration, however repressive and objectionable, do not deserve to
be labelled war crimes. Can it really be right that the same acts, when
they are the work of an organization that has taken power by armed
means and are perpetrated subsequent to the seizure of power, fulfil the
criteria of war crimes? Their only relationship with the armed conflict
is chronological: they follow the seizure of power. Yet the observation
that a group may be in a position to do things after it has taken power
that it was not previously able to do hardly seems an adequate nexus
for war crimes law to apply.
The discussions about the nexus generally involve establishing a
distinction with “ordinary” crimes. For example, not every killing that
takes place during a period of armed conflict constitutes a war crime.
The consequence is jurisdictional: if the act is a war crime, then the
international tribunal may be in a position to prosecute. Furthermore,
related concepts, such as universal jurisdiction and aut dedere aut
judicare, may also apply. Even if it is not a war crime, the act remains
a crime subject to prosecution by a domestic court, so that not all
criminal activity committed during an armed conflict automatically
drifts into the war crimes category. Moreover, the prosecution of such
“ordinary” crimes when they involve violent attacks on human dignity
may well be mandated by other sources of international law, such as
the international law of human rights.88
But the nexus problem may not present itself in the same manner
if the underlying act is not an “ordinary” crime at all. In some
circumstances such acts may constitute violations of international law,
particularly human rights law, but they will certainly not be war
crimes. When damage to or destruction of “buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected” is concerned, it is easy to imagine situations where such acts
will be entirely innocent when conducted outside the context of armed
conflict. Obviously, it is within the authority of a government to decide
to demolish “civilian” buildings, whether or not they are those
enumerated in the specific cultural property provision. It will often be
very clearly in the public interest to do so. Suppose that Ansar Dine
had decided that, in pursuit of its fundamentalist goals, all brothels,
drug dens and taverns were to be demolished. Suppose that in a sermon,
AL MAHDI » ICC-01/12-01/15-66-Conf, 17 December 2015, para. 2590,
fn. 872. The Prosecutor’s submission is in French only. It uses the term
‘motifs’ in a context that suggests what is meant is motives.
88.

Marguš v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455/10, § 139, 27 May 2014.
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and following a decision by the governmental authorities, Al Mahdi had
exhorted his followers to take their picks and iron bars and destroy such
institutions on the grounds that they were immoral and corrupt. Would
this too be a violation of international humanitarian law?
One consequence of the very broad approach to the nexus
requirement that the Court seems to have adopted is that it does not
treat the rebel “occupiers,” whose conduct becomes almost inherently
criminal, in the same way as it treats the government forces. This is a
one-sided approach to civil war that does not sit well with the
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law by which all
parties to a conflict are approached as equals. If Ansar Dine cannot
knock down a “civilian” structure in territory it controls without this
being labelled a war crime, then the same rule ought to apply to the
government of Mali, but it does not. Ansar Dine’s intent was to hold
on to power and eventually to govern the entire State. Acts of a rebel
regime may engage international responsibility, as crimes against
humanity, but the fact that power has been seized during an ongoing
civil war should not in and of itself be sufficient to constitute the nexus
required for prosecution as war crimes with respect to the efforts of the
rebel group to govern the territory that it holds.

VI. Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
In the course of League of Nations activity in the field of
international criminal justice, in the early 1930s, Raphael Lemkin
proposed two categories of international crime, “barbarity” and
“vandalism.” Many years later he wrote that this corresponded to the
concept he had labelled “genocide.” The two crimes were addressed to
“actions aiming at the destruction and oppression of populations.”
Lemkin described “vandalism” as “malicious destruction of works of art
and culture because they represent the specific creations of the genius
of such groups.”89 In 1947, Lemkin and two other consultants retained
by the United Nations Secretariat produced a draft genocide convention
that included, as a punishable act, the “systematic destruction of
historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses,
destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic,
89.

Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation,
Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for World Peace, 1944, p. 91; Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide as
a Crime Under International Law’, (1947) 41 American Journal of
International Law 145, at pp. 146-147. The idea that ‘vandalism’ should
be an international crime did not originate with Lemkin, however, but
seems to have been mooted by Vespasian V. Pella at least as early as
1929. See: Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014, p. 188; Philippe Sands, East West Street, On the
Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 2016, p. 157.
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or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.”90 But this
and other acts of “cultural genocide” were dropped from subsequent
drafts of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.91
Acts of cultural genocide, such as the “systematic destruction of
historical or religious monuments,” are therefore not punishable
pursuant to the definition of the crime that appears in the 1948
Genocide Convention, a definition that is reproduced in article 6 of the
Rome Statute. At best, evidence of cultural genocide may support
allegations that physical genocide has been perpetrated. In the Bosnia
v. Serbia case, the International Court of Justice held that there was
“conclusive evidence of the deliberate destruction of the historical,
cultural and religious heritage of the protected group during the period
in question.” However, said the Court, with reference to the travaux
préparatoires of the Convention, “[a]lthough such destruction may be
highly significant inasmuch as it is directed to the elimination of all
traces of the cultural or religious presence of a group, and contrary to
other legal norms, it does not fall within the categories of acts of
genocide set out in Article II of the Convention.”92 Taking the same
approach, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia said that “where there is physical or biological
destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and
religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks
which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to
physically destroy the group.”93
There is a substantial body of case law from the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia holding that under certain
circumstances the destruction of property may constitute the crime
against humanity of persecution.94 In the recent Karadžić judgment,
the Trial Chamber concluded that Serb forces had heavily damaged
mosques and Catholic churches as well as other cultural monuments
and sacred sites, “with discriminatory intent against Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats.” It said that “these incidents of wanton
destruction of private and public property, including cultural
monuments and sacred sites, constitute acts of persecution as a crime
against humanity.”95
90.

UN Doc. UN Doc. E/447, p. 17, art. I(3)(e).

91.

UN Doc. UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.83.

92.

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 344.
94.

Krstić (IT-98-33-T), Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 580.
Blaškić (IT-95-14-A), Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 149.
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In Prlić et al., a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found that the crime against
humanity of “inhumane acts” was committed with respect to a number
of acts directed against the Muslim population, including burning down
the village mosque in Graĉanica.96 It also concluded that the crime
against humanity of persecution had been committed because of a
number of acts, including the burning of mosques in Sovići and
Doljani.97 It said the same crime had been committed in East Mostar,
where the Croat forces willfully destroyed ten mosques and the Old
Bridge of Mostar “which had undeniable cultural, historical and
symbolic value for the Muslims.”98 The destruction of the Sultan Selim
Mosque in the town of Stolac was also deemed the crime against
humanity of persecution,99 as was the demolition of a mosque in
Ĉapljina.100
In her decision to proceed with an investigation into the Situation
in Mali, the Prosecutor ventured a very preliminary assessment that
“the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe
that crimes against humanity under Article 7 have been committed in
the Situation in Mali,” although she reserved her right to revisit the
issue in the future.101 She has not pursued the issue of crimes against
humanity in Al Mahdi, although at the August 2016 hearing the Office
of the Prosecutor insisted upon the discriminatory intent behind the
destruction of the mosques and mausoleums.102 The submissions were
in the context of aggravating factors for determination of the sentence
although they would certainly be germane to charges of the crime
against humanity of persecution. There appears to be evidence that
may justify a more substantial analysis by the Office of the Prosecutor
of the application of crimes against humanity to the destruction of
cultural property in Mali.103
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VII. Concluding Remarks
The trial of Al Mahdi generated much in the way of kudos for the
Prosecutor. At the same time, the case seemed far removed from where
the priorities of the Office of the Prosecutor ought to be at the current
time. The Court did not need yet another African situation, something
that could only bolster many of its critics. Although the destruction of
the Timbuktu monuments generated a certain amount of social alarm,
it is hard to reconcile this case of property destruction with the hesitant
position taken by the Prosecutor in other situations involving attacks
on human life and other violent crimes. The Mali case seems
inconsistent with the 2014 policy paper of the Office of the Prosecutor
pledging to focus on sexual and gender-based violence.
However, this article has not been concerned with the policy issues
but rather with the legal integrity of the Court. In its rush to pick some
low-hanging fruit, the Office of the Prosecutor based its case on a
provision in article 8 whose application to the facts is very doubtful. Al
Mahdi himself confirmed that he had been provided with legal advice
by counsel,104 but there is no way of knowing of what that consisted.
Perhaps he was told that there was a good argument about the
inapplicability of the charge but nevertheless chose not to contest. But
perhaps his counsel, like the judges, never took a close look at the
relevant text of article 8, the case law of the Court and of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, relevant
academic commentary, and the travaux préparatoires of the Rome
Statute. Al Mahdi was clearly responsible for a disgraceful act of
destruction but he had no involvement in an “attack” as this term is
used in article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute. Indeed, there was no
“attack” on the buildings and structures of Timbuktu, as the word
“attack” is meant in article 8(2)(e). Moreover, the proceedings also
indicate an approach to the nexus in a non-international armed conflict
by which the acts of rebels seem to be judged by a different standard
than those they are trying to displace.
The destruction of the religious and historical structures in
Timbuktu by religious extremists under the leadership of Al Mahdi is
rightly deplored around the world. Outrage at these acts cries out for
a response, including criminal prosecution of those who are responsible.
But that is not a good reason to convict Al Mahdi for a crime that he
did not commit. If he is found guilty as charged, in what for all intents
and purposes amounts to an ex parte hearing, where no vigorous defense
challenged the claims of the Prosecutor, a precedent of doubtful value
will be established. Reportedly, the Prosecutor intends to develop more
cases dealing with destruction of cultural property. Sooner or later the

104. Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Transcript, 22 August 2016, p.10, lines 1821.
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very serious shortcomings of the relevant provisions in article 8 of the
Rome Statute will become apparent.
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